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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
GUY I-I. WIGHT and
FLORENCE D. WIGHT, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No.

10248

EUGENE CALLAGHAN and
EDNA CALLAGHAN, his wife.
Defendants-Appellants.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by landlords against tenants
for unpaid rent, cleaning expenses, items removed
and da1nages to the premises.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court which rendered
a judgment for the landlords.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to uphold the judgment of
the trial court, and to have this appellate court
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2
award them the sum of $500.00 for attorney's fees
in answering appellants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' brief has not cited the page of the
record supporting any statements under their statement of facts as required by Rule 75 [p] [2] [2] [d].
Appellants' statement of facts refers to three
written leases. These are Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. Both
defendants executed Exhibits 2 and 4. Defendant
Eugene Callaghan did not sign Exhibit 3. Both defendants enjoyed uninterrupted possession of the
home from March 1, 1957 up to July 29, 1963. (R
366 lines 7-22)
By the terms of the written leases executed by
the parties, the defendants were to keep the home
and real property in a clean and satisfactory condition and upon termination of the tenancy, to leave
the premises, equipment and furnishings in as good
a condition as when entered upon except for reasonable wear and tear or damage by the elements or
fire. (paragraph No. 3 of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4)
By the terms of said written leases the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs for all damage or
injury to the premises during their tenancy. (paragraph No. 3 of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4)
By the terms of said written leases the defendants agreed to pay for cleaning the premises upon
the termination of the leases. (paragraph No. 4 of
Exhibits 2, 3 and 4)
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The written lease agreements between the parties provide that should the Lessor be compelled to
commence or sustain an action to collect rent or for
damages the Lessee shall pay a reasonable attorney's
fee to the Lessor. (paragraph No. 8 of Exhibits 2,
3 and 4)
At paragraph No. 3 on page 3 of appellants'
Statement of Facts they refer to making structural
improvements to the property. There is no evidence
in the record of any improvements made to the property by the appellants. The fact the appellants filed
a counter claim alleging certain improvements to
the property ( R 6) does not establish as a fact that
improvements were made. The trial court dismissed
this counterclaim prior to trial ( R 10) .
Throughout appellants' brief they have controverted Findings of Fact made by the trial court.
Rather than setting forth in this Statement of Facts
the evidence supporting the facts as found by the
trial court respondent will refer to the record under
the points set forth under the argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT EUGENE CALLAGHAN WAS LIABLE FOR ALL CLAIMED
DAMAGES.
The deposition of Eugene Callaghan was taken
by his attorney on September 6, 1963. Defendants'
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motion to open and publish this deposition was
granted by the trial court. (R 371 line 10)
At the taking of his deposition Eugene Callaghan admitted that he and Mrs. Callaghan had been
leasing property from Mr. and Mrs. Guy Wight at
3621 Highland Drive under three separate written
leases. (page 3 of Eugene Callaghan deposition)
Eugene Callaghan admitted entering into another lease with the respondents for the period from
the 1st of March, 1959 to the 29th of February, 1960.
(page 8 of deposition)
The defendant Eugene Callaghan was shown
a copy of the lease which he had not signed and was
asked:
Q. Is this a copy of a lease which you
intended to execute between yourselves and
the Wights?
A. Yes, as far as I know that is.
Q. Do you know any reason why your
signature does not appear thereon as a lessee
when your name appears as one of the lessees
in the typed part of the document?
A. I was not here. I was in Brazil at the
time this was dated and it was not sent to
me for my signature by Dr. Wight. (page 22
of Eugene Callaghan deposition.)
When Dr. Wight was questioned regarding the
second lease he stated that he had discussed it with
Mrs. Callaghan and she agreed that she would sign
the lease and he would sign the lease and that they
would not send it to Cyprus for Mr. Eugene Callag-
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5
han's signature. (R 46 line 2-4) Dr. Wight testified
that Eugene Callaghan indicated to him that he was
happy that his wife and family were living in the
home during this period. ( R 46 line 17-19)
The evidence is uncontroverted that both defendants enjoyed possession of the home from their
execution of the first lease until they surrendered
the premises to the plaintiffs on July 29, 1963. (R
366 lines 20-22)
Appellants -argue that the case should be remanded for elimination of all items of damage
charged to the defendant Eugene Callaghan which
occurred between the end of the first lease and the
commencement of the third lease. The only law which
appellants cite on this point is a general statement
to the effect that the burden of proving agency rests
on the party alleging it.
Appellants have overlooked numerous cases supporting the proposition that it is not essential to the
validity of a lease for the purpose of binding the
lessee that it be signed by the lessee, provided he
accepts the lease and acts thereunder. Jacobson v.
National Tea Co. (1924) 51 ND 889, 200 NW 910;
Holbrook v. Chamberlin (1874) 116 Mass 155, 17
Am Rep 146; William Wicke Co. v. Kaldenberg Mfg.
Co. (1897) 21 Mise 79, 46 NYS 937; Carroll v. St.
John's Catholic Total Abstinence & Mut. Relief Soc.
(1878) 125 Mass 565; Fitton v. Hamilton City
(1870) 6 Nev 196; Munford v. Humphreys (1924)
68 Cal App 530, 229 P 860; Means v. Dierks (1950,
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CAl 0. l(an) 180 F2d 306. These cases stand for the
proposition that a lease signed by the landlord alone
is binding on the tenant where he has accepted the
lease and taken possession of the property.
In the Fitton v. Hamilton City case the Nevada
Supreme Court said:
It is the plainest dictate of justice and
right, that if one obtain possession and occupy
premises under a lease, he should be holden
to accept it subject to all the covenants and
obligations of the instrument. supra 6 Nev.
200
In the case of Spann v. Gulley (1958) 233 Miss
62, 101 So. 2d 337 a formal lease was prepared by
the lessor as requested by the lessee. The lessee re..
mained in possession without notifying the lessor
that the terms of the lease were unacceptable. The
court upheld the action for rent for the period the
premises were occupied stating that the lessees' were
bound by the lease they had not signed because of
their remaining in possession and failing to notify
that any terms of the lease agreement were unsat..
isfactory.
In the case the defendant Eugene Callaghan
executed the first lease agreement dated January
18, 1957. (Exhibit 2) The second lease agreement
not signed by Eugene Callaghan specifically states
that Eugene Callaghan and Edna S. Callaghan, his
wife, are lessees. (Exhibit 3) The third lease dated
May 10, 1960 is executed by both defendants. (Ex-
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hibit 4) There ·never was any termination of both
defendants quiet and peaceable enjoyment of the
premises.
One further principle precludes the necessity
for remanding this case to the trial court under this
Point I. This is based upon the fact that the time
the damages occurred is within the knowledge of
the defendants and not the knowledge of the plaintiffs. Defendants resided at the premises and had
possession of the premises during the full term of
Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. Plaintiffs did not check for damages even though they might have been on the premises during the terms of the lease because they believed right up to the end of the tenancy that the
defendants were going to purchase the premises.
(R 103 lines 10-15) Mrs. Wight testified that she
was not around this house more than half a dozen
times in the six years that the defendants rented it.
(R 154 line 27) She testified that the defendants
had frequently told her that they were going to buy
the home and for this reason she did not pay any
special attention to their upkeep of the home. (R
160 lines 1-23 )
POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS DID PROVE THAT DAMAGES
OCCURRED WHEN LEASES WERE IN EF-

FECT.

Mrs. Edna Callaghan admitted that they never
turned possession of the premises back to the plaintiffs at any time during the period from March 1,
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1957 to July 29, 1963. (R 366 lines 20-22) Appellants contend the case should be remanded to the
trial court for a new trial to determine which damages occurred during a four month period from
March 1, 1960 to June 30, 1960. This is the period
between Exhibits 3 and 4, except Exhibit 4 is dated
May 10, 1960 not June 30, 1960. Mrs. Callaghan
testified that this period where they did not have
a written lease was an accommodation for both parties. (R 366 line 11-14) Defendants did not turn
the possession back to the plaintiffs at any time during this period. (R 366 line 20-22) The terms of the
previous written lease applied during this hold over
period. This is the way the parties themselves intended as exhibited by the defendants retaining possession and paying rent at the same amount as the
previous written lease. (R 366 lines 17-19)
Appellants contend a fatal defect in the plaintiffs' case because there is no finding as to when any
of the damage occurred. Appellants have overlooked
that the findings specifically provide that the damages occurred during "their occupancy of the premises." Finding of Fact No. 5 made by the trial court
is that defendants resided at the home as tenants
from early 1957 until vacating the premises on July
31, 1963. (R 17) Finding No. 10, No. 11, No. 12,
No. 14, No. 15, No. 16 and No. 17 provide that the
damages or lost items occurred during defendants
occupancy of the premises. (R 18 and 19) Finding
No. 22 of the trial court provides that plaintiffs
were not aware of many of the missing and damaged
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items prior to the termination of the defendants
tenancy. (R 20)
It is true that the evidence does not state the
exact date of many of the damages. However if the
damages occurred during a period during which a
lease was not in effect (and it is respondents' position that a lease was in effect during all of the possession of the defendants - s:upported by the cases
set forth in Point I) then the burden shifts to
the defendants to establish that the damages occurred
during the period no lease was in effect. This i_s based
upon the principle set forth in the case of M ott v. Good
Roads Machinery Company, 277 App. DIV. 677, 102
NY Supp. 2d 781, that the one who exclusively has
the information runs the risk of a failure to produce.
This principle that defendants must produce
evidence of when the damages occurred is particularly applicable in this case as this evidence lies peculiarly within their knowledge. Plaintiffs have
established and the trial court has found that damages occurred during the period of defendants tenancy. Dr. Wight stated that he had no way of knowing when the damages occurred and that he did not
maintain an inspection of the premises during the
time the defendants were there. (R 103 lines 10-15)
POINT III.
DEFENDANTS WE R E NOT CHARGED
WITH NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR NOR WITH
IMPROVEMENTS.
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In each of the applicable Findings of Fact the
trial court expressly found that the damages were
beyond reasonable wear and tear. (Findings 13, 14
and 17. (R 19-20) In view of. the assertions in appellants' brief that the facts do not support the findings made by the trial judge respondent will set forth
below each of the items awarded by the trial court
and list after each award the places in the record
supporting the finding made by the trial court.
Finding 9.
Rent for July 1963 ------------------------$183.33
( R 47 lines 26-30) ( R 48 lines
1-15)
Finding 10.
Rug ___ ___ _______ ______ ____ ________ ____ ______ __ _______ 200.00
(R 49 lines 9-29) (R 50 lines 1623)
Finding 11.
Water damage dining room ____________ 13.76
(R 54 lines 7-20) (R 55 line 9)
Finding 12. Removed Items:
Screen Door Closures ---------------------- 6.15
(R 58 lines 13-21)
Shields and Covers for Gable
Lights _____________________ __ __ __ __ __ _____________ 12.00
(R 59 lines 1-6)
Screen for the Bar-Be-Que Pit ______ 9.16
(R 59 lines 9-24)
.
00
35
Navajo Saddle Blanket -----------------(R 59 line 29 toR 60 line 11)
.
95
10
Light Fixture in the Shop ---------------(R 61lines 3-6)
Night Latch in the Shop __________________ 3.75
(R 61lines 17-23)
.
50
10
Screen Door in the Shop ------------------
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(R 61line 25 to R 62 line 4)
5.82
Garage Door Handles ---------------------( R 62 lines 8-24)
Window Lock in the Garage __________
3.25
( R 62 lines 25-30)
Door Stop in the Garage -----------------1.50
( R 63 lines 2-5)
Check Ropes in the Garage -----------.60
( R 64 lines 18-23)
Wire Clothes Lines and
Turnbuckles _____ __ ____ ____________ ___ ___ ______ ____ _ 2.85
(R 64 lines 25-30)
Bird Bath ---------------------------------------4.50
(R 65 lines 1-6)
Total Missing Items ------------$105.13
Finding 13. Damaged Items:
Curtain Rods ------------------------------------$ 15.00
(R 57 lines 3-14)
Broken Tile in the Bar-Be-Que Pit__
4.28
(R 66 line 14 to R 67 line 7)
2.00
Broken Sprinkler Head -----------------(R 67line 13 toR 68 line 13)
Water Softener which was not
useable ---------------------------------------------- 100.00
(R 68 line 25 toR 69 line 29)
1.45
Electrical Outlets and Switches ____
(R 70 lines 5-16)
Damages to the back wall lying
along the East boundary of the
property ------------------------------- ___________ __ 30.00
(R 80 line 26 toR 81 line 27)
Holes in the Rain Gutter
on the Roof -------------------------------------2.50
(R 86 line 30 toR 87 line 20)
Broken Lead Glass Window ____________ 10.00
(R 97lines 5-10) (R 991ine 7)
Burned Drain Board ---------------------- 45.00
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(R 95 lines 2-6) (R 239 line 18)
Gaping hole in Wall of an
Upstairs Bedroom ---------------------------- 50.00
(R 71line 11 toR 72 line 20)
Total items damaged or
broken ----------------------------------$258.43
Finding 14.
Yard Damage ------------------------------------$10.00
(R 84 lines 9-18) (R 411lines
16-30)
Finding 15.
Water damage shop ------------------------$775.88
(R 56 lines 4-12) (R 56 lines
21-25) (R 117 line 19)
Finding 16.
Bedroom rug ------------------------------------$ 26.00
(R 143 lines 15 to 27)
Finding 17. Restoring Premises :
( R 77 lines 17-21)
(R 89lines 11-16)
(R 90 lines 10-17)
(R 90 line 25 toR 93line 6)
(R 96line 22 toR 97line 5)
(R 97lines 18 to 21)
(R 132lines 8 toR 133 line 23)
Spackle and Lumber ---------------------- 79.39
(R 98 lines 1-4)
Paints and other miscellaneous
rna terials _____ ------------------------__ ___________ 200.15
(R 99 lines 9-12)
Labor of a paper hanger __________________ 25.00
(R 93 line 12)
Labor of Plaintiff Guy H. Wight
in repairing and restoring
premises -------------------------__________ __ _______ 300.00
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(R 52 lines 11-19) (R 100 line 26
toR 101line 14)
_
Labor of Florence D. Wight in
repairing and restoring premises __ 225.00
(R 142line 15 toR 143line 14)
(R 144 lines 18 to 29) (R 148
lines 28 to 149line 26) (R 181
lines 15 to R 182 line 9)
Total of items in this
Paragraph ----------------------------$829.54
Finding 18.
Attorney's fees --------------------------------$568.64
(R 162lines 11-22)
The trial court found that by the terms of the
written leases executed by the parties the appellants
were to keep the home and real property in a clean
and satisfactory condition and upon termination of
the tenancy to leave the premises, equipment, and
furnishings in as good as condition as when entered
upon, except for reasonable wear and tear or damage
by the elements or fire. (Finding 6) (R 17 and 18)
This finding is supported by paragraph No. 3 of
Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.
The trial court found that by the terms of the
leases the appellants agreed to pay the respondent
for all damage or injury to the premises during their
tenancy. (Finding 7) (R 18) This finding is supported by paragraph No. 3 of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.
The trial court found that by the terms of said
leases defendants agreed to pay for cleaning the
premises upon the termination of the leases. (Finding 8) (R 18) This finding is supported by paragraph No.4 of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.
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In many instances the trial court did not grant
the amount sought by respondent but instead granted
less than the claimed damage :
Damaged carpeting from smoldering and
spilling of a can of paint, requested $300.00
(R 50 lines 16-23) v $200.00 awarded;
Ruined water softener $150.00 (R 69
line 29) v $100.00 awarded;
Labor of Plaintiff Guy Wight $600.00
(R 101 lines 1-14) v $300.00 awarded;
Labor of Florence D. Wight $525.00 (R
183 lines 10-15) v $225.00 awarded;
Gaping hole in the wall of upstairs bedroom $135.00 (R 172 lines 19-20) v $50.00
awarded;
Restoration of yard $450.00 (R 183 line
28 to R 185 line 7) v $10.00 awarded.
The respondents having prevailed in the trial
court are entitled to have the evidence on conflicting matters viewed in a light most favorable to them.
Weenig v. Manning, 1 Utah 2d 101, 262 P 2d 491
and Larson v. Evans, 12 Utah 2d 245, 364 P 2d 1088.
The case of Jespersen v. Deseret News Pub. Co.,
(1951) 119 Utah 235, 225 P 2d 1050 involved an
action by a landlord against a tenant for rent and
damages. The court said:
This case being one brought to enforce
the terms of a lease and no equitable iss?es
being involved, this court can only revieW
errors of law and not of fact. Art. VIII, Sec.
9, Constitution of Utah. (225 P 2d page 1052)
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In spite of this law respondents believe it is
necessary to answer specifically the shotgun charges
made by appellants in this point. The most pernicious
charge made by appellants is that "probably" they
have been charged twice for all items. (Page 14 of
Appellants' Brief) This charge is not supported
when the record is carefully examined.
Appellants base this broad assertion on their
contentions that $45.00 awarded for the burned
drainboard (Finding 13) (R 19) and $1.45 for
broken electrical outlets and switches (Finding 13)
(R 19) were also included in the award for materials, Finding 17 ( R 20) .
Dr. Wight was asked whether or not any of
the damaged or missing items which had been itemized in his testimony were included in the general
figures for materials and he answered that there
is no duplication. (R 98 lines 23-24) He explained
what items were represented in these general figures
and that he had at the trial invoices for many items.
(R 99 lines 4-30)
Dr. Wight stated specifically that the $200.15
figure awarded for paints and materials (and which
appellants claim includes the burned drainboard
and broken electrical outlets and switches) represents: "Just the paints and materials in the rooms
I had to do over, because of damages to the walls I
had to repair." (R 99 line 11-12) In Point No. III
~ppellants have cited their evidence and completely
Ignored the evidence of respondents which support
the findings of the trial court.
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Appellants argue that the rug for which the
trial court awarded $200.00 in damage was worn
out from years of tramping over it. (Page 12 of Appellants' Brief) Appellants overlook the testimony
of a real estate agent who said this rug which covered
all of four rooms of the downstairs of the house was
in good condition. (R 33line 28-30) Appellants' own
expert witness admitted that the rug was of high
quality and would appear to have another ten years
of useful life. ( R 237 line 3)
This is the rug which when the premises were
surrendered to respondent had a large smoldered
area in the living room and a can of paint spilled
on it in the guest bedroom. (R 49 lines 14-22)
In arguing that this rug was worn out apellants
overlook the fact that their witness estimated that
this rug had been in use only five or six years. (R
236 lines 26-27)
Mr. Van Tassell, another witness called by appellants, admitted that the damaged rug was one of
the reasons that he did not purchase this home from
the respondents. (R 208 lines 13-14) He stated that
it was a good rug and could have been used for some
time in the home but for the damage. (R 209 lines
6-11)
Appellants object to being charged for a water
softener. (Page 12 of Appellants' Brief) Plaintiffs
testified the water softener was practically brand
new when the tenancy started. (R 69 line 2) Doctor
Wight testified that the water softener was not op-
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erative when the premises were surrendered by defendants. (R 69 line 11-13) He stated that it was
of a value of $150.00 (R 69 line 29) and was not
repairable. (R 70 lines 3-4) The trial court correctly
awarded judgment in the sum of $100.00 based upon
this evidence. ( R 19)
Appellants argue that "it is not at all uncommon for a landlord to have to redecorate a vacated
apartment only after a few months of occupancy, in
order to find a new tenant." (Page 16 of Appellants'
Brief) This argument overlooks the fact that respondents were not seeking to have their premises
redecorated but to recoup the damages which have
been ite1nized previously in this point.
Dr. Wight expressly stated that he had not included any expenses which would be for normal wear
and tear. (R 99 lines 19-30) He explained that he
did not list costs on any items which could be attributed to normal wear and tear. (R 131 lines 14-28)
Dr. Wight testified that the house was in top
condition both inside and outside when the appellants started their tenancy. ( R 135 lines 15-25) He
also stated that the house had been professionally
cleaned including the rugs prior to the appellants
rnoving in. (R 135 lines 26-27)
The repainting which was required was not due
to the condition of the paint but the numerous nail
and bolt holes which had been placed throughout the
home. (R 144 lines 5-11) Mrs. Wight confirmed the
fact that it would not have been necessary to repaint
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the rooms, except for the hallway, if the appellants
had not left so many holes and other damages to
the walls. (R 159 lines 1-17)
The general statements from Corpus Juris Secundum defining "wear and tear" cited in appellants' brief are not applicable to the facts of this
case. The trial court expressly found that all items
for which respondents have recovered were beyond
reasonable wear and tear. Allowing the water to run
over in the bathtub (R 54 lines 7-10); knocking out
a hole in a wall ( R 71 line 23) ; spilling a can of paint
on the rug and allowing it to smolder (R 49 lines
16-19); allowing water to run from a broken pipe
for 29 days ( R 56 lines 21 to 25) ; constructing a
fire on the front lawn of a landscaped home (R 83
lines 21 to 30) ; placing 42 nails in one panel door
and 49 on two walls of a room (R 90 lines 28-29)
is not reasonable wear and tear.
At page 20 of their brief respondents have confused the requirement for cleaning the premises upon the termination of the lease (Paragraph No. 4
of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4) with the paragraph which
has an exception for reasonable wear and tear. When
the lease specifically provides, as it does in this case,
that the tenants will pay for cleaning at the termination of the lease there is no point in citing cases
to the effect that reasonable wear and tear would
affect their duty to do the cleaning.
Appellants cite a general statement from the
An1erican Law of Property to the effect that it was
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error for the trial court to charge defendants with
fire damage even though appellants were negligent.
(Page 21 of Appellants' Brief) The trial court has
not charged appellants for fire damage. The evidence
shows that there was no fire which caused damage
to the rug. ( R 334 line 29 to R 335 line 3) Finding
No. 10 specifically recognizes this evidence and states
that the living room rug of the plaintiffs had smoldered without evidence of visible flame. (R 18)
Appellants quote a general statement of Corpus
Juris Secundum concerning damage by the elements.
(Page 22 of Appellants' Brief) This statement
covers repairs made necessary by water from freezing to outer portions of the building. In this case
the facts are that a pipe burst inside the building
and sprayed the inside of the building for a period
of at least 29 days. (R 56 lines 21 to 25)
Appellants argue that the respondents have
been unjustly enriched to such an extent that it
shocks the conscience. The facts do not support such
unwarranted assertions. A review of the facts in
the record which have been previously outlined in
this portion of this brief is a sufficient answer to
such a broad assertion as this.
POINT IV:
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE
TESTIMONY OF SUBSEQUENT ORAL REVISION OR AMENDMENT OF WRITTEN CON-

TRACT.
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In Point No. IV appellants contend that the
trial court erred in refusing testimony regarding a
verbal variance of the terms of the lease pertaining
to repairs. Respondent can not understand how this
would affect the findings or judgment of the trial
court
. as respondents received no recovery for repa~rs.

Even assuming it might have something to do
with damages the record clearly shows that the trial
court did not exclude any testimony or strike any
testimony from the record. The trial court merely
commented that a question of defense counsel was
not important as there was no consideration for it.
(R 317lines 12-13) No ruling was even .made by the
trial court. Appellants made no attempt to show any
consideration for a modification of the lease. The
record shows defense counsel evidently fully acquiesced in the trial court's statement and did not
pursue the matter any further.
Respondent has no dispute -with the law and
case cited at page 24 of appellants' brief. There simply is no evidence of any agreement or of any consideration for a new agreement in the record, and
appellants made no attempt to establish for the record.
POINT V.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS HAVING WAIVED OR BEING ESTOPPED TO CLAIM DAMAGES.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
In making this claim the appellants evidently
assume that all of the damages occurred prior to
execution of the third lease on May 10, 1960. (Exhibit 4) There is no evidence in the record that such
is the case.
Appellants argue that because plaintiff Dr.
Wight was on the premises during the tenancy that
he was aware of conditions. This is contrary to the
evidence (R 103lines 10-15) and the findings of the
trial court. (Finding 22 R 20)
Appellants next argue that if plaintiffs were
aware of conditions they had a duty to object. The
law does not so require. In Volume 32 of Am Jur
Section 815 of Landlord and Tenant it is stated as a
general rule that no action lies for a breach of a
covenant to leave in good condition until the expiration of the tenancy. The reason for this rule is that
although the tenant during the term allows the premises to become in bad condition he has a right to the
premises and it cannot be said, because of their condition at any time during the term, that they will
not be left in a proper condition at the end of the
term.
POINT VI.
APPELLANTS WERE NOT CHARGED
WITH THE LOSS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
ABANDONED BY RESPONDENTS.
Appellants' argue that a saddle blanket, bird
bath and sprinkler are personal property (Page 26)
The evidence shows that the saddle blanket was a
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rug in the upstairs hallway (R 60 lines 2-7), that
the bird bath top was in the yard ( R 65 line 4), and
that the sprinkler was part of the system for watering the yard. (R 67 line 13 to R 68 line 13) The
$2.00 awarded for the sprinkler was not because the
sprinkler was lost as erroneously argued by appellants but because of damage to the sprinkler. (Finding 13 described as broken sprinkler head) (R 19)
Appellants acknowledged in Paragraph No. 12
of the leases that all furnishing are received in good
condition and they agree to return the same at the
expiration of the lease in good condition, reasonable
wear and tear accepted (Exhibits 2, 3 and 4) There
is no evidence of any abandonment of these items
by the respondents.
POINT VII.
FINDING 9 IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE AND RENT WAS OWED TO RESPONDENT.
Appellants do not dispute that they owe rent
for the month of July. They dispute this rent is owed
to respondents. Appellants argument is that one Glen
Van Tassel was entitled to this rent rather than the
respondents. (Page 28 of Appellants' Brief)
Appellants could produce no evidence at the
trial that they had paid Mr. Van Tassel the rent for
this month. Mrs. Callaghan was asked directly
whether or not she could produce a cancelled check
showing that Mr. Van Tassel had been paid this rent
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and she could not do so. ( R 362 line 29 to R 363
line 1)
In Point No. VII the appellants rely on a purported agreement covered by Finding No. 21 made
by the trial court. ( R 20) In this finding the trial
judge held that the uniform real estate contract was
not supported by legal consideration and was not a
binding agreement. (R 18) Mr. Van Tassel admitted
he has no claim to the premises. (R 197 lines 26-28)
Defendants called Mr. Van Tassel as a witness
and he did not testify as to receiving any rent from
them. (R 190-221) He does not claim he is entitled
to this rent. To the contrary he admits that he did
not go through with the contract to purchase the
home and he has no claim to the premises. (R 197
lines 26-28) (Exhibit 10 where Van Tassel releases
any claims under the purported agreement to respondents.)
The rent for July of 1963 was owed to respondents as the trial court found. ( R 18)
POINT VIII
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR COSTS.
Plaintiffs Point VIII is based upon the erroneous assumption that plaintiffs did not file a memorandum of costs. The memorandum of costs is found
in the record at page 440 and 441.
This memorandum was filed in the District
Court within five days of the completion of the trial
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in this action, and a copy of the memorandum of
costs was served upon appellants by mailing them
a copy on the day prior to filing with the District
Court. (R 441)
CROSS APPEAL
POINT I.
THE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDED TO
RESPONDENT IS INSUFFICIENT TO COVER THE FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL.
The agreements executed by the parties provide
for payment of a reasonable attorney's fees if respondents are compelled to commence an action for
dan1age or re11ts. (Paragraph 8 of Exhibits 2, 3 and
4) Both parties agreed to attorney's fees in a sum
set by the Utah State Bar Advisory Handbook. (R
162 lines 11-22) The trial court has awarded as reasonable attorney's fees the amount set forth in the
Advisory Handbook for a default case presented
without proof as to the reasonableness of attorney's
fees in actions for the collection of money. Finding
18 (R 20)
The Advisory Handbook provides for a fee of
$500.00 for representing a respondent before the
Supreme Court of Utah.
Respondent is aware of the rule that attorney's
fees on appeal are discretionary with the Supreme
Court. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Invest?nent Company 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P 2d 709 (1955)
It is respectfully submitted that an additional fee
of $500.00 should be awarded to the respondent for

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
the purpose of covering their additional costs occasioned by this appeal.
CONCLUSION

The judgment awarded to respondents by the
trial court is supported by the facts in the record.
Appellants have advanced no legal basis for remanding this case for further trial or eliminating any
part of the judgment.
It is respectfully requested that this court affirm the judgment of the trial court and award an
additional $500.00 to the respondents for their attorney's fees incurred because of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted
RICHARDS, BIRD &
HART &
LON RODNEY KUMP
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Respondents
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